Is There Only One Scientific Interpretation of Legal Statements?

Authors

  • Véronique Champeil-Desplats Université de Paris Nanterre

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2024.4637

Keywords:

Interpretation, Methods, Realism, Legal Science

Abstract

Among the various propositions that structure Thomas Hochmann’s theory of interpretation, this article sets out to discuss three main ones. Firstly, the assertion that interpreting ‘is not very complicated’; secondly, the thesis that scientific interpretation only consists in determining a set of intrinsic meanings to legal texts; and thirdly, the idea that the realist theory of interpretation, by refusing to research the meaning of legal statements, would impoverish the study of law. On the other hand, it will be argued, firstly, that interpretation is a complex act that can involve several methods and, secondly, that insofar as it takes into account this plurality of methods and possible meanings, the realist theory of interpretation enriches the study of law. Rather than being based on certainties, it is based on doubts about the conditions of true knowledge and the production of this truth by an act of will.

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References

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Published

2024-10-28

How to Cite

Champeil-Desplats, V. (2024). Is There Only One Scientific Interpretation of Legal Statements?. Discusiones, 33(2), 78–99. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2024.4637

Issue

Vol. 33 No. 2 (2024): The Scientific Interpretation of Law and the Challenge of Legal Realism

Section

Main Section

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Copyright (c) 2024 Véronique Champeil-Desplats

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