El paradójico estatus del número y la figura en la filosofía de Spinoza

Authors

  • Mario A. Narváez UNLPam

Keywords:

figure, number, truth

Abstract

The explanation of the origin of the number and the figure offered by Spinoza in some of his texts places mathematical entities in the lowest segment of the kinds of knowledge, that is, that of the imaginative knowledge. However, in another group of texts, Mathematics continues being the paradigm of rational knowledge. This situation is another variation of the problematic relation between imagination and understanding in Spinoza’s philosophy. In the present article we try to clarify Spinoza’s conception of the number and the figure in order to find a satisfactory way out of the mentioned paradoxical situation. With this purpose, on the one hand, we describe the Spinoza’s vision of number and figure as imaginative entities and, on the other hand, we contrast this vision with that of Mathematics as an ideal of rational knowledge. Then, we critically examine some attempts to overcome this paradox. Finally, we expose our interpretation, which is based on two key points: the complementarity of imagination and understanding, and the internalist theory of truth.

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References

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How to Cite

Narváez, M. A. (2018). El paradójico estatus del número y la figura en la filosofía de Spinoza. Cuadernos Del Sur Filosofía, (45), 79–95. Retrieved from https://ojs.uns.edu.ar/csf/article/view/890

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