La crítica de Gilles Deleuze a la anámnesis platónica

Abstract

The main subject of this article is Gilles Deleuze ́s critique of Plato ́s theory of recollection (anámnesis). The aim is to show that his critique against Plato has the very same argument that Socrates uses against Meno to introduce the theory of recollection in the homonimous dialogue. This dialogue introduces the hypothesis that knowledge is a recollection of contents acquired pre-viously to our birth in order to dismantle the paradox that Meno has presented, i.e., the search for knowledge is an idle search because either we already know what we seek for, or, if we did not, we wouldn ́t recognize it. Socrates asserts that such an argument renders us lazy and indifferent. We argue that, ironically, Deleuze ́s critique maintains that the theory of anámnesis renders us lazy and indifferent because it renders us passive. Given that thought consists of a mere recollection of pre-existing contents, then, it leaves no place for creation, which is the main function of thought in Deleuze ́s philosophy.