Some remarks on membership theory

Authors

  • Lucas Grosman Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2006.2613

Keywords:

Justice, Dworkin, Rawls

Abstract

I will argue that the principle of membership proposed by Rosenkrantz can not have the conceptual or explanatory function that it is assumed to have. This principle can not capture central tenets regarding the practice under analysis. It is contradictory with some restraints proposed by Rosenkrantz himself. In the third section I will focus on Rosenkrantz´s arguments employed to justified law application  under unjust socioeconomic circumstances

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Published

2006-12-15

How to Cite

Grosman, L. (2006). Some remarks on membership theory. Discusiones, 6, 59–88. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2006.2613

Issue

Section

Main Section