Achilles, the Tortoise and the Application of Legal Rules as a "Particularistic Affair" without Particularism

Authors

  • Gabriela Scataglini Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2021.2975

Keywords:

Legal Syllogism, Inference, Know How, Particularism, Pragmatic Application

Abstract

I focus on two aspects of Duarte d’Almeida’s paper “What is it to apply law?” identified as: 1) the legal syllogism is a bad reconstruction of the reasoning that leads to – and also justifies – a judicial decision; and 2) that the inference leading to a judicial decision is of a particularistic nature, not being an universal principle with which judges commit themselves when applying a legal rule. Regarding 1) I show some analogy with Lewis Carroll’s dialogue “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” and draw upon Gilbert Ryle’s conception of inference as a know how. Based on Rylean considerations, I mark the scope of my agreement on 2), and finally I disagree on what is to be involved in what the author calls “pragmatic application” of law.

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Author Biography

Gabriela Scataglini, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Doctora de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Profesora adjunta interina de Teoría General del Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Published

2021-12-27

How to Cite

Scataglini, G. (2021). Achilles, the Tortoise and the Application of Legal Rules as a "Particularistic Affair" without Particularism. Discusiones, 27(2), 59–76. https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2021.2975