Disagreeing with Moreso. Moral Disagreements in Ethics, Meta-ethics and Law

Abstract

This essay examines José Juan Moreso’s theses on moral disagreements as argued in his recent book Lo normativo: variedades y variaciones. First, I will briefly summarise the debate on moral disagreements, introducing some distinctions. Then, I will analyse Moreso’s thesis on moral disagreements: in particular, it seems to me that Moreso’s argumentative strategy consists in trying to show that all acceptable metaethical positions have difficulties in accounting for the existence of genuine, faultless moral disagreements. Against this argument, I will try to show how some positions, both cognitivist and non-cognitivist, can instead account for them. In the conclusions I will also formulate an argument (admittedly, not a decisive one) to show that the thesis of the non-existence of genuine, faultless and radical moral disagreements is self-defeating.