Do Norms Dream of Electric Sheeps? On norms as artifacts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52292/j.dsc.2024.4735Keywords:
Regulative norms, Hyletic and expressive conception, Abstract artifacts, Norms and reasonsAbstract
The purpose of this work is to conduct a critical evaluation of the central thesis defended by Juan Pablo Mañalich in “Conduct Norms as Abstract Artifacts.” Firstly, the author’s criticisms against the hyletic and expressive conceptions of norms are examined to demonstrate that there is indeed a fundamental difficulty with the criterion underlying such a distinction. Secondly, Mañalich’s characterization of conduct norms as abstract artifacts is specifically considered, pointing out the various difficulties it entails.
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